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Abstract
This paper presents a new voice impersonation attack using
voice conversion (VC). Enrolling personal voices for automatic
speaker verification (ASV) offers natural and flexible biomet-
ric authentication systems. Basically, the ASV systems do not
include the users’ voice data. However, if the ASV system
is unexpectedly exposed and hacked by a malicious attacker,
there is a risk that the attacker will use VC techniques to repro-
duce the enrolled user’s voices. We name this the “verification-
to-synthesis (V2S) attack” and propose VC training with the
ASV and pre-trained automatic speech recognition (ASR) mod-
els and without the targeted speaker’s voice data. The VC
model reproduces the targeted speaker’s individuality by de-
ceiving the ASV model and restores phonetic property of an in-
put voice by matching phonetic posteriorgrams predicted by the
ASR model. The experimental evaluation compares converted
voices between the proposed method that does not use the tar-
geted speaker’s voice data and the standard VC that uses the
data. The experimental results demonstrate that the proposed
method performs comparably to the existing VC methods that
trained using a very small amount of parallel voice data.
Index Terms: automatic speaker verification, voice conversion,
voice impersonation, automatic speech recognition, phonetic
posteriorgrams
1. Introduction
Automatic speaker verification (ASV), which offers natural and
flexible biometric authentication systems, has been actively
studied in recent decades [1, 2]. Because the ASV systems
identify the speaker of the input voice without using other bio-
metrics, they are preferred for use in keyword spotting [3] and
voice search implemented in smartphones. Among the ASV
systems, text-independent ASV has the potential for highly
portable speaker verification.
With deployments of ASV systems, we need to discuss the
possibility of voice impersonation attack via the ASV systems.
Specifically, if a malicious attacker exposes and hacks the ASV
models, voices of the enrolled speakers risk being reproduced
by the attacker. Voice conversion (VC) [4, 5, 6], which converts
voices into the targeted speaker’s ones, is a possible way for this
type of attack. We call this attack verification-to-synthesis (V2S)
attack that builds VC models from the pre-trained ASV model.
Since ASV systems basically do not include voice data of the
targeted speaker, we cannot perform the standard VC training
using the targeted speaker’s voice. However, since the ASV
model learns the speaker’s individuality, deceiving the model
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Figure 1: Comparison of standard DNN-based voice conver-
sion (VC) described in Section 2 and proposed verification-to-
synthesis (V2S) attack described in Section 3. ASV indicates
automatic speaker verification.
has some possibility of reproducing the targeted speaker’s indi-
viduality by VC.
This paper proposes a V2S attack using a VC model trained
with a ASV model. In this paper, we use a “white-boxed” ASV
model, which means the attacker knows a deep neural network
(DNN) architecture and the targeted speaker’s label. Since the
ASV model does not use phonetic property of the input voice,
training the VC model using only the ASVmodel will lose pho-
netic property of the converted voice. Therefore, we further use
the automatic speech recognition (ASR) model prepared by the
attacker for restoring the phonetic property. The VC model is
trained by not only deceiving the ASV model but also matching
the output of the ASR model (i.e., phonetic posteriorgrams [7])
predicted from the input and converted voices. In the experi-
mental evaluation, we evaluate the performance (i.e., natural-
ness and speaker individuality of the converted voice) of the
proposed V2S attack with the existing VC methods (Section 2)
because their performances are the upper limit of the proposed
method. The experimental results demonstrate that the pro-
posed method performs comparably to the existing VC methods
trained using a very small amount of parallel voices.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly
reviews conventional VC methods that require the targeted
speaker’s voice data. Section 3 introduces the V2S attack that
constructs the VC model with the ASV model and without the
targeted speaker’s voice. Section 4 presents the experimental
evaluations. Section 5 concludes this paper with a summary.
2. Building voice conversion using targeted
speaker’s voice
This section describes standard VC techniques using a targeted
speaker’s voice: parallel and non-parallel VC (shown in the up-
per half of Fig. 1). They are references to evaluate the perfor-
mances of the proposed V2S attack.
2.1. One-to-one parallel VC [8]
LetG(·) be a VCmodel (a.k.a., an acoustic model), and let x =
[x⊤1 , · · · ,x
⊤
t , · · · ,x
⊤
T ]
⊤ and y = [y⊤
1
, · · · ,y⊤t , · · · ,y
⊤
T ]
⊤
be the source and targeted speakers’ acoustic feature sequences
extracted from a parallel speech corpus, respectively. t and T
denote the frame index and total frame length, respectively. xt
and yt are the source and targeted speakers’ acoustic feature
vectors at frame t, respectively. A converted acoustic feature
sequence yˆ = [yˆ⊤
1
, · · · , yˆ⊤t , · · · , yˆ
⊤
T ]
⊤ is given as yˆ = G(x).
G(·) is trained to minimize a prediction error: e.g., mean
squared error (MSE) between y and yˆ defined as
LMSE (y, yˆ) =
1
T
(yˆ − y)⊤ (yˆ − y) . (1)
2.2. One-to-many non-parallel VC
In one-to-many VC, i.e., VC from a source speaker to any
arbitrary speakers, G(·) is often trained using multi-speaker
corpora in advance, and is adapted using the specific targeted
speaker’s voice data. This paper utilizes the d-vector-based
model adaptation method [9]. The method employs another
DNN that estimates a d-vector (i.e., DNN-based continuous
speaker representation [2]) of the targeted speaker, and feeds
it to the VC model to convert the source speaker’s features into
the targeted speaker’s ones.
3. V2S attack: building voice conversion
without using targeted speaker’s voice
This section proposes a novel voice impersonation attack named
a V2S attack (shown in the lower half of Fig. 1). Unlike
methods described in Section 2, the VC model is trained from
a white-boxed ASV model but without the targeted speaker’s
voice data. Besides the ASV model, we use an ASR model for
the VC model training. Deceiving the ASV model helps to re-
produce the targeted speaker’s individuality and using the ASR
model helps to restore the phonetic property of the input voice.
3.1. ASV model to be attacked
We assume that the attacked ASV system has an ASV model
V (·) that extracts a latent variable of the speaker identity from
input speech. In this paper, we construct a d-vector-based ASV
model [2] and train it to recognize one of the enrolled S speak-
ers. The sy th speaker is identified by the one-hot speaker code
ly = [ly(1), · · · , ly(s), · · · , ly(S)]
⊤ whose element is defined
as
ly(s) =
{
1 if s = sy
0 otherwise
(1 ≤ s ≤ S), (2)
where s is the speaker index. At run time, V (·) outputs
a frame-level posterior probability of the specific targeted
speaker. Let V (y) = [v⊤1 , · · · ,v
⊤
t , · · · ,v
⊤
T ]
⊤ be the prob-
ability sequence. vt = [vt(1), · · · , vt(s), · · · , vt(S)]
⊤ is the
probability vector at frame t. vt(s) is the probability that yt
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Figure 2: Conceptual diagram of proposed V2S attack.
is uttered by the sth speaker. V (·) is trained to minimize the
softmax cross-entropy (SCE) loss defined as
LSCE (ly ,V (y)) = −
1
T
T∑
t=1
S∑
s=1
ly (s) log vt (s) . (3)
As described in Section 1, we set a situation in which the
DNN architecture of V (·) and the targeted speaker’s label are
given. Therefore, we can estimate the difference between the
targeted speaker’s individuality and that of the converted acous-
tic features, yˆ, as LSCE (ly ,V (yˆ)) that can be backpropagated
to other DNNs for their training.
3.2. ASR model to restore phonetic property
Training the VC model to deceive the ASV model, i.e., to min-
imize LSCE (ly ,V (yˆ)), can be expected to reproduce the tar-
geted speaker’s individuality. However, it does not guarantee
that the phonetic property of the input voice will be restored
during the VC process. Therefore, we use the ASR model
R(·) to compute the discrepancy between the phonetic proper-
ties of the input and converted voices. As R(·) predicts frame-
level phonetic posteriorgrams of the input voice, we can esti-
mate the discrepancy as the MSE between R(x) and R(yˆ),
i.e., LMSE (R (x) ,R (yˆ)), and can use it for the proposed VC
model training.
3.3. Training of VC model
A loss function L(·) for the proposed VC model training is
given as
L (x, yˆ, ly) = LSCE (ly,V (yˆ)) + ωLMSE (R (x) ,R (yˆ)) ,
(4)
where ω is a hyperparameter that controls the weight of the
second term. Note that Eq. (4) does not include the targeted
speaker’s acoustic features y and therefore we can construct the
VC model without using them. Figure 2 illustrates a conceptual
diagram of the proposed V2S attack.
3.4. Discussion
The V2S attack is regarded as one kind of voice spoofing at-
tack [10]. The aim is the same: masquerading oneself as an-
other targeted speaker. So far, studies on voice spoofing at-
tacks have focused on spoofing attacks (spoofing by synthe-
sized voices) [10] and replay attacks (spoofing by replayed
voices) [11]. The V2S attack follows the former and tries to
reproduce the targeted speaker’s voice from the ASV model.
A similar idea was used in Saito et al.’s work [6] that incorpo-
rated a voice anti-spoofing (i.e., a discriminative model to detect
spoofing attacks) into training of a VC model for reproducing
fine structures of the synthesized voice.
From the above perspectives, our approach is close to that
of Kinnunen et al. [12]. They proposed algorithms to select
an utterance from public-domain corpora to deceive the ASV
model. On the other hand, we aim to build the VC model for
synthesizing every utterance of the targeted speaker.
An adversarial attack (e.g., for automatic speaker recogni-
tion [13] and image classification [14]) is the common attack for
pre-trained recognition models. The purpose of the V2S attack
is completely different from that of the adversarial attack: the
adversarial attack aims to let the discriminator misclassify the
input sample, but the V2S attack aims to reproduce attributes
of the targeted sample (e.g., speaker individuality) from the dis-
criminator.
From the above perspectives, a classifier-to-generator at-
tack [15] and a membership inference attack [16] are ap-
proaches related to our V2S attack. They attack a pre-trained
model to estimate the training data distribution or the data them-
selves from the model. Using these attacks is expected to im-
prove naturalness in our converted voice, e.g., estimating ut-
terances close to the training data of the ASV model will help
deception by the VC model.
The proposed training algorithm does not use pre-stored
speakers’ voice data, unlike one-to-many non-parallel VC [9]
and Kinnunen et al.’s work [12]. One of our future direc-
tions is to use the pre-stored speakers’ voice data to improve
speaker individuality of the converted voice (e.g., using transfer
learning [17]). Also, integrating high-fidelity waveform gener-
ation [18] and using end-to-end ASV and ASR models [19, 20]
is remaining challenges for the V2S attack in more realistic sit-
uations.
In this paper, the VC model is trained by attacking an
white-boxed ASV model. A more realistic situation is an at-
tack against the black-boxed ASV model, i.e., features, DNN
architectures, and targeted speaker’s label are unknown for the
attacker. For instance, black-box optimization based on gen-
erative adversarial networks [21, 22] or reinforcement learn-
ing [23] can be introduced to the proposed V2S attack. Per-
formances of the white-boxed case described in this paper will
be the reference for the black-boxed case.
4. Experimental evaluation
4.1. Experimental setup
Acoustic features used in VC, ASV, and ASR were 39-
dimensional (1st-through-39th) mel-cepstral coefficients and
their delta features. The STRAIGHT [24] vocoder systems were
used for the feature extraction. The frame shift was 5 ms. We
set two types of conversion: male-to-male and male-to-female.
One male was the source speaker, and two males and two fe-
males were the targeted speakers. We conducted evaluation for
each pair of source and targeted speakers using their 25 parallel
voices as the evaluation data.
The VC model for the V2S attack was a Feed-Forward neu-
ral network with 78 input units, {256, 128} ReLU [25] hidden
units, and 78 output units. The ASVmodel was a Feed-Forward
neural network with 78 input units, {1024 × 3, 8× 1} sigmoid
hidden units, and 260 output units. The ASR model was a
Feed-Forward neural network with 78 input units, 1024 × 4
sigmoid hidden units, and 56 output units (56 is the number of
phonemes). Utterances by 260 Japanese speakers (130 males
and 130 females) were used for training the ASV and ASR
models. The four targeted speakers (two males and two fe-
males) were in the 260 speakers since we performed the pro-
posed V2S attack towards the white-boxed ASV model. Ada-
Grad [26] with the learning rate setting to 0.1 was used for
training the VC model. The VC model training was performed
with 25 epochs using 200 utterances of the source speaker. The
weight ω in Eq. (4) was set to 0.01. In the V2S attack, the spec-
tral parameters were converted by the VC model. The 0th mel-
cepstral coefficients and band-aperiodicity were not converted,
i.e., the original speaker’s features were directly used for wave-
form generation. For F0 conversion, the targeted speaker’s F0
is not observed in the V2S attack. This problem is not solved
in this paper. Therefore, we calculated F0 statistics (mean and
variance) from the targeted speaker’s voice data, and performed
linear conversion of F0 [5].
In one-to-one parallel VC, we trained a DNN for spectral
conversion. The DNN architecture was the same as that for the
VCmodel of the V2S attack. The number of training data is dis-
cussed in the following section. The DNN was trained with 25
epochs. The F0 and band-aperiodicity conversions are the same
as those in the V2S attack. In one-to-many non-parallel VC, the
DNN architectures, training data, and other hyperparameters are
the same as those in Saito et al.’s work [9] that used variational
autoencoders [27] conditioned by phonetic posteriorgrams [7]
and d-vectors [2] as the VC model.
4.2. Experimental results
We compared converted voices of the proposed V2S attack with
those of the existing VCmethods. We conducted preference AB
tests on the naturalness of the converted voice. Methods to be
compared were listed as follows.
• ParaVC: parallel VC (Section 2.1) trained with 5, 10, or
30 utterances
• NonparaVC: Non-parallel VC (Section 2.2)
• V2S: proposed V2S attack (Section 3)
We presented a pair of converted voices in random order and
had listeners select the voice sample that sounded more natural.
Similarly, preference XAB tests on the speaker individuality
were conducted using the natural voices of the targeted speakers
as reference samples “X.” These tests were done in our crowd-
sourcing evaluation system. Forty listeners participated in each
evaluation, and each listener evaluated 10 samples randomly ex-
tracted from the evaluation data. The total number of listeners
was 2 (AB or XAB) × 2 (male-to-male or male-to-female) × 4
(reference methods) × 40 (listeners) = 640.
Table 1 and Table 2 list results of the preference AB tests
for male-to-male and male-to-female conversion, respectively.
Similarly, Table 3 and Table 4 list those of the preference XAB
tests for male-to-male and male-to-female conversion, respec-
tively. From Table 1 and Table 2, the proposed V2S attack has
lower quality than “NonparaVC.” On the other hand, it has com-
parable or superior quality to “ParaVC (5 utts)” for both male-
to-male and male-to-female conversion. From Table 3 and Ta-
ble 4, the V2S attack performed worse in terms of speaker indi-
viduality than most settings of the existing VC, but it performed
comparably to “ParaVC (5 utts)” for male-to-male conversion.
From these results, the proposed V2S attack is potentially com-
parable to the standard parallel VC with a very small amount of
training data.
5. Conclusion
This paper presents a new voice impersonation attack us-
ing voice conversion (VC), named the verification-to-synthesis
Table 1: Results of preference AB tests on naturalness (male-to-
male). Bold indicates the method preferred more with p-value
< 0.05.
A Scores p-value B
ParaVC ( 5 utts) 0.388 vs. 0.612 1.221×10−10 V2S
ParaVC (10 utts) 0.475 vs. 0.525 0.158 V2S
ParaVC (30 utts) 0.458 vs. 0.542 0.016 V2S
NonparaVC 0.598 vs. 0.402 2.694×10−8 V2S
Table 2: Results of preference AB tests on naturalness (male-to-
female). Bold indicates the method preferred more with p-value
< 0.05.
A Scores p-value B
ParaVC ( 5 utts) 0.490 vs. 0.510 0.572 V2S
ParaVC (10 utts) 0.593 vs. 0.407 1.365×10−7 V2S
ParaVC (30 utts) 0.610 vs. 0.390 3.174×10−10 V2S
NonparaVC 0.538 vs. 0.462 0.034 V2S
(V2S) attack. The VC model was trained to deceive the white-
boxed automatic speaker verification (ASV) model for repro-
ducing the targeted speaker’s individuality and to restore pho-
netic property of the input voice by using pre-trained automatic
speech recognition (ASR) model. The experimental results in-
dicated that the proposed V2S attack can synthesize voice that
has naturalness and speaker individuality comparable to an ex-
isting parallel VC with a very small amount of training data.
In future work, we will evaluate the V2S attack that uses pre-
stored speakers’ voice data and investigate the dependency of
the input speaker in our method.
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